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Turkey:
Impact of Population Growth

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A Research Paper

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A Research Paper

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Key Judgments

Information available as of 23 November 1984 was used in this report.

Turkey's new civilian government under Turgut Ozal is trying to restructure the economy along free market lines, a controversial experiment that has begun to erode the traditionally dominant role of the state. This government and its successors will have to cope with large population growth and massive youth unemployment for the remainder of this century. Because joblessness among youth—combined with the pressures of rapid social and economic change—was a critical factor in the unrest and violence that brought down the last civilian government in September 1980, we believe the potential for serious disturbances in Turkey will remain great.

Although Turkey's population growth is slowing as a result of declining fertility, over the next 15 years we expect:
- Total population will grow roughly 46 percent over 1980—an annual average of 1.9 percent—to 67 million; the number of Turks aged 15 to 24 will increase from 9 million to 13 million.
- Job creation at best probably will only match labor force growth; some 1.8 million Turks may be without jobs in the year 2000—compared with 1.9 million in 1980 and a peak of 2.2 million in 1985.
- Turks in the 15-to-24 age group may account for 60 percent of the unemployed by the year 2000. The unemployment rate for this group is likely to reach 25 percent—compared with 21 percent in 1980.
- Only one-sixth of new jobs will be created on farms; nonfarm employment will nearly double to 57 percent of the total.
- The urban population will nearly double to 40 million and boost its share of total population to 60 percent; metropolitan Istanbul will have some 9 million residents by the end of the century.
- The number of secondary school graduates in the labor force will double to 3 million; reducing the unemployment rate significantly for this group from 1980's 28 percent will pose a major challenge for Ankara.

These trends will profoundly affect the Turkish political scene. Increasing urbanization and better education will not only lessen the influence of traditional rural conservatism but will also raise expectations. The increase in the nonagricultural labor force is likely to expand greatly the size and influence of organized labor, raising the potential for labor-government confrontations.

Although the Ozal government has made impressive beginnings in instituting reforms to accommodate the problems that demographic change will bring, both the political and economic reforms could unravel. Turkey's democratic institutions are fragile and vulnerable to political instability and terrorism. Many of the economic and social problems associated with rapid population growth will take years to correct, even under the best of circumstances. In particular, the prospect of prolonged massive unemployment among the nation's youth raises the specter of a renewal of unrest and violence in the years ahead, which could once again bring the military "out of the barracks" to install authoritarian government.

In our view, this is the most likely alternative to a continued evolution toward democracy if Turkey's leaders prove unable to cope with the pressures of demographic change. In the light of the country's history and the challenges it will confront, there is a very high probability that an episode of military rule—perhaps a prolonged one—will recur by the end of the century. Other alternatives—such as a move toward Islamic radicalism—are also conceivable but not very likely, in our view, largely because the military is almost certain to retain the strength and will to suppress them.

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Turkey: Impact of Population Growth

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Introduction

Turkey in the past two decades has been shaken by political, religious, and labor unrest. Political violence has twice precipitated military intervention. The military imposed partial martial law from March 1971 to September 1973 and took full control from September 1980 to December 1983. The most recent episode was triggered by a wave of unrest and violence that reached a peak in 1979-80 with some 3,200 killings in the 21 months before the imposition of military rule. Although the unrest and violence are in part the product of tensions involving unassimilated ethnic and religious minorities, political violence accelerated after a period of rapid population growth and sociological change that severely strained the country's political institutions and economic structure. 25X1

This research paper will review the demographic trends that have formed the backdrop to violence and military rule in Turkey and analyze the links between them. In addition, it will project population trends, analyze their social implications, and assess the ability of the political and economic institutions to deal with the challenges they will face. 25X1

Emergence of the Demographic Issue

Demographic trends have added enormously to the problems that Turkish policymakers have had to confront since the end of World War II. The population explosion that took place in these four decades intensified the challenges that Turkey as a developing country would have had to face in any event:

- Providing enough services to satisfy the basic needs of the rural masses flooding into the new and old urban centers.
- Providing enough jobs to hold unemployment within socially tolerable levels.
- Coping with the social tensions inherent in the mingling of disparate ethnic and religious groups in the industrial centers of modern Turkey. 25X1

Surging Population Growth. The population jumped from roughly 19 million to 46 million from 1945 to 1980, an average annual growth of 2.6 percent. The current (1981-85 average) population growth rate is 2.2 percent annually, but the number of Turks still is

Table 1
Turkey: Socioeconomic Indicators

	1950	1960	1970	1980
Health				
Persons per physician	3,298 [a]	3,435	2,528	1,964 [b]
Person per auxiliary health worker [c]	3,479	1,881	1,073	636 [b]
Persons per hospital bed	1,121	616	496	461 [b]
Urban-rural differences in vital statistics				
Births per 1,000 population				
Urban	40 [d]	39 [e]	39 [f]	30
Rural	51 [d]	49	42 [f]	35
Deaths per 1,000 population				
Urban	16 [d]	15 [e]	12 [f]	7
Rural	24 [d]	21 [e]	19 [f]	18
Life expectancy at birth (*years*)				
Urban	NA	58 [g]	62 [h]	64
Rural	NA	49 [g]	54 [h]	56
Infant mortality (*per 10,000 live births*)				
Urban	NA	104 [g]	86 [h]	74
Rural	NA	179 [g]	150 [h]	131
Education (*percent*)				
Literacy rate, age 10 and over	34	41	58	68
Of which, urban	NA	65	73	NA
Literacy rate, age 10-14	48	55	77	85
Of which, urban	NA	83	88	NA
Graduates as a share of population age 15 and over				
Primary	16.1	24.0	34.4	42.1
Middle and secondary	4.2	5.5	7.2	14.5
Of which, secondary	NA	NA	3.7	7.2
College	0.6	0.7	1.3	2.6

[a] 1951.
[b] 1979.
[c] Dentists, registered nurses, midwives, and health administrators.
[d] 1955-60.
[e] 1960-65.
[f] 1965-70.
[g] 1967.
[h] 1974-75.

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Table 2 *1000 persons*
Turkey: Labor Force and Employment by Economic Sector

	1960			1970			1980		
Sector	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Total labor force	**12,719**	**7,433**	**5,286**	**15,058**	**9,420**	**5,638**	**18,122**	**12,207**	**5,915**
Total employed	**12,593**	**7,317**	**5,276**	**14,090**	**8,825**	**5,265**	**16,186**	**10,614**	**5,572**
Unemployed	126	116	10	968	595	373	1,936	1,593	343
Agriculture	9,486	4,464	5,022	9,299	4,623	4,676	9,369	4,527	4,842
Industry	1,211	1,069	142	1,796	1,507	289	2,384	2,161	223
Mining	74	73	1	110	106	4	139	136	3
Manufacturing	849	710	139	1,219	946	273	1,520	1,312	208
Construction	278	276	2	422	413	9	625	619	6
Utilities	10	10	NEGL	45	42	3	100	94	6
Other sectors	1,896	1,784	112	2,995	2,695	300	4,433	3,926	507
Trade	454	444	10	657	631	26	1,027	983	44
Transport and communications	237	232	5	359	343	16	514	490	24
Finance	83	71	12	146	115	31	282	214	68
Services	952	885	67	1,712	1,533	179	2,507	2,184	323
Of which, defense	467	467	0	550	550	0	750	750	0
Other and poorly defined	170	152	18	121	73	48	103	55	48

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increasing by about 1 million annually—a rate second only to Iran in the region. Improving public health services are a main factor behind current growth, with the death rate falling more quickly than the birth rate (table 1).

Lagging Job Creation. Job creation over the past 20 years has been sluggish in the face of growing needs, mainly because of shrinking employment opportunities in agriculture. As a result of rapidly expanding mechanization and increasing use of fertilizers and improved seed, the virtual doubling of agricultural output between 1960 and 1980 was accomplished without any increase in the work force. In fact, farm employment fell 1.2 percent during these years. Diminished employment opportunities in agriculture have hurt mainly landless sharecroppers, particularly in the Black Sea, West Anatolia, Marmara, and Central Anatolia Regions.

Turkish governments have sought unsuccessfully to take up the slack with large industrial and infrastructural investments and policies intended to stimulate private nonagricultural investments. Job creation in industry, nonetheless, has been disappointingly low, accounting for only about one-third of the 4-percent annual gain in urban employment during the 1961-80 period. Other sectors—principally services, and including the armed forces—accounted for 60 percent of the increase. By 1980, nonagricultural activity accounted for 42 percent of total employment, up from 25 percent in 1960 (table 2).

Rising Unemployment. Unemployment has climbed steadily for the last two decades. In 1970, 6.4 percent of the labor force was unemployed, up from 1 percent in 1960. At the end of the 1979/80 recession, some 1.9 million Turkish workers, 10.7 percent of the active

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Table 3 *Percent*
Turkey: Unemployment Rates by Sex, Age Group, and Level of Education, 1980

	Both Sexes	Men	Women
Total	**10.7**	**13.0**	**5.8**
Age 15 to 24	20.6	22.6	16.1
Age 25+	6.3	8.7	1.6
Secondary school graduates	28.4	23.5	43.5
College graduates	11.3	10.6	14.2
All other educational levels	9.2	12.2	3.4

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labor force, were without jobs.[1] Persons in the 15-to-24 age group, particularly those with secondary school diplomas, have borne the brunt of unemployment, with a 1980 jobless rate almost double the national average (table 3). Nearly 60 percent of the unemployed in 1980 were in this age group, most (including discharged military conscripts [2]) seeking first jobs. A sizable number of the jobless, however, now are experienced industrial workers who lost their jobs during the 1979/80 recession. The jobless are concentrated in urban areas, where unemployed students and workers have been joined by the rural unemployed in search of jobs in growing urban industries. 25X1

[1] The unemployment estimates used in this paper are those of the author and represent his calculation of the "core" unemployment rate. They are considerably lower than the commonly accepted estimates of Turkish unemployment, which ranged as high as 20 percent of the labor force in 1980. These figures, in the author's view, are based on the inclusion of some questionable categories in the labor force, such as housewives and urban males over 50 who have not worked for prolonged periods, who probably cannot be counted as unemployed in the sense of actively seeking jobs. In fact, Turkish official statistics vary widely, depending on the issuing office or agency. The Turkish Census, for example, reported unemployment figures in 1980 that went as low as 4.5 percent in October. This excessively low estimate apparently included all persons who had done any work—even casual labor or odd jobs—in the week preceding enumeration as "employed."

[2] About 80 percent of the 750,000 members of the Turkish armed forces in 1980 were conscripts. Males are drafted at age 20 (educational deferments to age 32 are permitted) and serve for a period of 22 months. Turnover, thus, is roughly 330,000 conscripts annually.

Figure 1
Turkey: Population and Labor Force, 1930-2000



a High series is 27.5; low series is 27.4.

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The unemployment situation would be worse if not for the slow growth of the labor force—only 1.7 percent annually during 1961-80. The apparent discrepancy between slow labor force growth and rapid growth in

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Table 4
Turkey: Labor Force Participation Rates, 1980

Percent

Age	Total	National			Urban [a]			Rural [a]	
		Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
15+	64.5	84.2	43.5	49.1	80.2	14.1	80.0	88.4	71.4
15-19	60.3	69.3	50.2	36.5	54.1	15.9	81.5	82.8	80.0
20-24	70.5	92.0	46.4	60.6	91.7	21.8	83.4	92.5	74.5
25-29	70.0	95.5	41.6	61.5	95.1	20.1	81.7	96.1	67.7
30-34	70.5	96.4	42.3	59.9	96.6	17.4	83.7	96.8	71.2
35-39	70.8	96.5	43.7	56.5	96.8	12.2	87.0	97.0	76.9
40-44	70.8	94.7	46.8	51.8	92.4	10.0	88.6	96.9	80.7
45-49	69.8	91.2	48.3	46.5	84.5	7.5	90.1	97.1	83.1
50-54	66.3	85.0	46.1	43.0	74.5	7.8	86.0	94.0	77.4
55-59	60.3	76.8	42.5	33.4	59.4	4.1	81.3	90.2	71.9
60-64	51.8	67.5	36.4	26.9	52.7	2.6	68.8	77.6	60.1
65+	31.5	43.7	20.8	11.3	23.2	2.0	43.0	51.2	32.3

[a] Estimated from 1975 data.

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the working-age population, particularly among the 15-to-24 year-old population, reflects in large part the withdrawal of women from the labor force. The decline in working women largely is a result of rising agricultural productivity resulting from increased mechanization, which has reduced the need for women to work on family farms. It is also a byproduct of the migration from rural to urban areas where—in common with most Muslim countries—jobs for women are scarce. The trek to the cities also has produced a decline in average male participation rates because of enhanced educational opportunities for those in the 15-to-24 age group and scarcer job opportunities for those 50 and over (see table 4).[3] Despite the low growth rate, however, the labor force expanded by some 300,000 persons annually during the 1970s, reaching 18.1 million persons in 1980.

[3] The decline in Turkey's male labor force participation rate during the past 20 years has been well below the average for the country's neighbors in the north and east Mediterranean region. Turkey's female participation rate, on the other hand, has declined substantially more than the average, being exceeded only by that of Syria. See table A-1 for comparative labor force statistics for 12 of Turkey's neighbors in the north and east Mediterranean region.

Another factor helping to dampen labor force growth during the last two decades has been the migration of skilled and semiskilled Turkish workers abroad. The Turkish State Planning Organization estimates the net outflow from 1963 to 1980 at 42,000 to 46,000 workers annually (excluding dependents)—roughly equivalent to 15 percent of the increment in the Turkish labor force during the period. From 1963 to 1974, most went to Western Europe—mainly West Germany—under guest worker agreements between the Turkish Employment Service and West European governments.[4] Following heavy restrictions on new migrants by the West European countries after 1974, most Turkish workers have since gone to Libya and other Middle Eastern countries. 25X1

Urbanization. Agricultural mechanization and the rapid growth of the industrial and service sectors have stimulated urbanization. Urban population growth 25X1

[4] Under the agreements, Turkish workers had to be at least 25 years old and to have at least primary school diplomas to qualify for the guest worker program. 25X1

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has averaged about 4.7 percent annually in the last two decades, with about one-half of it the result of rural-urban migration, as (mostly young) people moved to the cities in search of jobs. Urban expansion—some 740,000 persons annually in the 1970s—has raised the urban population (residents of cities and towns of 10,000 or more) from 30 percent of the total in 1960 to 45 percent in 1980—a figure that is still well below the level in most other countries in the region.[5]

The expansion of urban housing has fallen far behind population growth. A growing share of urbanites live in shantytowns *(gecekondus)* surrounding the cities. An extreme example is Ankara, where close to one-half of the city's 1.9 million people (1980) live in such shantytowns.

On the brighter side, impressive progress has been made in health and education, despite Turkey's limited funds and administrative resources. Gains in medical care, provision of potable water supplies, and sanitation improvements have continued to lower the death rate and to increase life expectancy. At the same time, substantial increases in school enrollment rates have greatly reduced illiteracy and improved the skill level of the labor force.[6]

The countryside has been left well behind and has more in common with Turkey's Asian than European neighbors.[7] Rural infant mortality remains far higher than in urban areas, and life expectancy averages 56 years, compared with 64 years in the cities (table 1). The persisting lag in rural primary education, especially in the eastern half of the country, is responsible for the very slow decline in the number of illiterates.

[5] We use the Turkish Government's definition of urban areas. According to the conventional UN definition—residents of cities and towns of 20,000 or more—40 percent of Turkey's population resided in urban areas in 1980.

[6] College enrollment has lagged, however. Although the government embarked on a program in the late 1970s to greatly expand college facilities, it is nowhere near satisfying the demand for college places. In 1980, 467,000 applicants competed in entrance exams for only 43,000 available college places.

[7] See table A-2, for comparative socioeconomic statistics for 12 of Turkey's neighbors in the north and east Mediterranean region.

Government Responses to Population Growth

Birth Control Programs. The government has sought to improve living standards by preventing a return to the 3-percent annual population growth rates of the 1950s. A family planning program was begun in 1965 to provide birth control information and services, and abortion was authorized in 1967 for a broad range of medical causes. By 1971, nearly 5,000 medical personnel were participating in the birth control program, and more than 500 birth control clinics were in operation throughout the country. The government has made extensive use of the communications media to promote family planning, and its efforts have been supplemented by those of the private Turkish Family Planning Association, founded in 1963.

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The program has had a substantial impact. By 1968, one-third of women at risk of pregnancy were practicing birth control, and by 1978 the figure had risen to one-half. As a consequence, the total fertility rate (the number of children an average woman would have during her childbearing years) dropped from 5.2 in 1975 to 4.4 in 1980. City dwellers have been most responsive to family planning; in rural areas, a large family still tends to be viewed as an economic asset as well as a demonstration of virility. The total fertility rate for urban women stood at 3.5 in 1980 compared with 4.4 in 1975, whereas that for rural women had only dropped to 5.4 from 5.8.

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Modernization. At the founding of the Turkish Republic, Istanbul was the economic—as well as the governmental and social-cultural—center of the country. The Ataturk government's decision to shift the capital to Ankara in Central Anatolia was indicative of its commitment to extend industrial development and modern infrastructure, as well as health, educational, and other socioeconomic services, throughout the country. One major means of extending industrialization has been the establishment of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), which in 1980 accounted for some 20 percent of employment (and 30 percent of value added) in manufacturing and about 10 percent of total nonagricultural jobs. The government has located many of the SEEs in the east in an effort to offset the tendency of private firms to locate in the

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Table 5
Turkey: Regional Distribution of Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1980, and Average Annual Growth Rates, 1961-80 [a]

Percent

Region	Total Labor Force		Unemployment		Total Employed		Agriculture		Non-agriculture		Of Which, Industrial	
	Distribution	Growth	Distribution	Rate [b]	Distribution	Growth	Distribution	Growth	Distribution	Growth	Distribution	Growth
Turkey (67 provinces)	100.0	1.8	100.0	10.7	100.0	1.2	100.0	−0.1	100.0	4.0	100.0	3.4
Marmara (8)	19.6	5.8	22.4	12.2	19.2	2.0	11.0	−0.5	30.5	4.0	36.3	4.8
Of which, Istanbul	9.1	4.0	11.2	13.2	8.8	3.7	0.1	−0.7	19.7	4.1	25.8	5.4
Aegean (4)	10.4	2.4	10.1	10.4	10.5	1.9	10.1	0.9	11.0	3.6	9.1	1.3
Of which, Izmir	5.0	3.4	4.6	9.9	5.1	3.0	3.7	1.9	6.9	4.1	4.9	1.2
West Anatolia (8)	7.8	1.0	7.5	10.2	7.9	0.4	8.4	−0.7	7.1	3.1	8.4	2.3
Black Sea (10)	13.8	0.9	15.1	11.8	13.6	0.2	15.9	−0.9	10.5	4.1	11.7	2.7
Mediterranean (4)	8.4	2.8	8.2	10.3	8.5	2.3	9.0	1.3	7.8	4.7	8.6	4.9
Of which, Adana	3.0	3.2	3.2	11.1	3.0	2.7	3.1	1.7	3.0	4.4	3.7	5.2
Central Anatolia (15)	23.4	1.4	24.6	11.3	23.2	0.9	24.0	−0.6	22.2	4.5	16.9	2.8
Of which, Ankara	5.8	3.1	5.0	9.3	5.9	2.9	2.5	−0.8	10.4	5.1	6.5	3.8
East Anatolia (13) [b]	11.6	1.3	8.4	7.7	12.0	0.9	15.6	0.3	7.1	3.5	5.7	3.6
Southeast Anatolia (5) [c]	5.0	1.6	3.7	7.9	5.1	1.2	6.0	0.3	3.9	4.0	3.5	3.3
Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Ankara	22.9	3.5	24.0	11.2	22.8	3.2	10.2	0.8	40.1	4.4	40.9	4.4

[a] For a listing of the provinces in each region, see table A-3.
[b] Of the nonagricultural labor force in East Anatolia, about one-third represent the armed forces.
[c] Of the nonagricultural labor force in Southeast Anatolia, about one-fifth represent the armed forces.

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west. It has made considerable progress in these efforts, but average levels of industrial and socioeconomic development and per capita income remain substantially higher in the west.[8] Indeed, Istanbul's share of total industrial employment actually has risen since 1960 (table 5).

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[8] There are some striking contrasts. Although only 52nd in level of urban literacy, Gaziantep Province in Southeast Anatolia ranks seventh among Turkey's 67 provinces in level of industrialization, fourth in urbanization, and 16th in the percent of households with electricity. Moreover, three provinces each in the Marmara and Black Sea Regions and eight in Central Anatolia are closer to the provinces of East and Southeast Anatolia than to other western and central provinces in levels of industrialization and urbanization, although their socioeconomic levels average somewhat higher. For a comparison of urbanization, industrialization, and socioeconomic levels among the 67 provinces, see table A-3.

In spite of Ankara's efforts to spread the wealth, there remain significant disparities between those provinces best endowed with agricultural, energy, and other natural resources and those generally lacking in them. Job opportunities continue to vary widely within as well as among geographic regions, triggering substantial internal migratory flows—mostly in westward and southwestward directions—over the past 20 years (see map). For example, the 18 provinces with the poorest employment records during 1961-80 grew by only 1.2 percent annually. On the other hand, the 25 provinces with the greatest employment gains during the period—reflecting increases in both agricultural and nonagricultural employment—grew by 4.1 percent annually during the period. The Mediterranean and

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Table 6 *Percent*
Turkey: Regional Distribution of Total and Urban Population, 1980, and Average Annual Growth Rates, 1961-80 [a]

	Total Population		Urban Population		Urban
	Distribution	Growth	Distribution	Growth	
Turkey (67 provinces)	100.0	2.5	100.0	4.7	45.4
Marmara (8)	19.7	3.4	30.7	4.9	70.6
Of which, Istanbul	8.9	5.0	22.0	5.3	92.6
Aegean (4)	8.9	2.6	10.2	3.9	51.9
Of which, Izmir	4.4	3.3	7.0	4.2	71.8
West Anatolia (8)	7.2	1.7	5.2	3.9	32.7
Black Sea (10)	13.4	1.9	7.5	4.0	25.4
Mediterranean (4)	8.8	3.5	9.6	5.2	49.8
Of which, Adana	3.3	3.6	4.3	5.1	58.3
Central Anatolia (15)	24.5	2.5	24.4	5.0	45.2
Of which, Ankara	6.4	4.1	11.0	5.7	78.6
East Anatolia (13)	11.8	2.3	6.8	4.8	26.0
Southeast Anatolia (5)	5.7	3.0	5.6	5.2	44.2
Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, and Ankara	24.9	4.3	44.3	5.2	80.7

[a] For a listing of the provinces in each region, see table A-3.

Kurdish Population Growth

We project that the growth of the Kurdish population—Turkey's most restive ethnic minority—will keep pace with the growth of the general population. Under our high projection, the Kurdish population will rise from an estimated 4.6 million in 1980 to 6.6 million in 2000. Under our low projection, the Kurdish population will reach 5.6 million. Our projections are based on the number of Turks speaking Kurdish as either a first or second language (2.65 million or 8.5 percent of the total population) as counted in the census of 1965, the last census in which such information was published. (Ankara maintains that the Kurds are not an ethnic minority and, therefore, does not publish official statistics on them.) Our high projection assumes that, because of many Kurds' reluctance to disclose their ethnic origins, the 1965 enumeration constitutes an undercount and that their true number was more like 10 percent of the 1965 population of 31 million. Our low projection does not make this assumption. 25X1

Although conventional wisdom in Turkey has it that rural Kurdish women have higher fertility rates than other rural women, there are no fertility studies or other reliable data to substantiate this. Because 96 percent of the Kurds lived in rural areas in 1965, we projected both 1965 figures to 1980 by the rate of natural increase of Turkey's total rural population, and to the year 2000 by the natural increase in our high projection. 25X1 25X1 25X1

Marmara Regions headed the list, with the slowest growth in the West Anatolia, Black Sea, and East Anatolia Regions[9] (table 6).

Prospects for Future Population Growth
Despite the reduction in fertility rates in the last 10 to 15 years, Turkey's population problems will remain formidable in the years ahead. We estimate the population will grow to between 65.4 million and 68.2 million by the end of the century, with a midrange projection of 66.9 million. In other words, we believe Turkey's population will grow by about 1 million persons yearly through this century, compared with 900,000 persons annually during 1961-80 (table 7).[10] 25X1

[9] For statistical comparisons among these 43 provinces, see tables A-4 and A-5. The correlation between gains in industrialization and socioeconomic categories and the rate of job creation attained during 1961-80 is surprisingly low. For example, of the 16 provinces having the highest levels of industrialization, only 10 are among the 25 provinces with the highest employment growth during 1961-80, while three are among the 18 provinces with the poorest employment records. On the other hand, five provinces from among the 27 with the lowest levels of industrialization rank among those with the highest employment growth during the period.

[10] Our projections are based on the assumption that the fertility rate will decline somewhat faster in the years ahead than in the recent past. In our high-growth scenario (1.1 million persons annually), we assume that the reduction in the fertility rate for rural women will drop only slightly faster than in 1976-80. Under the low-growth scenario (970,000 persons annually), we assume that the government's family planning program will help to bring down fertility somewhat more rapidly among rural women than under the high-growth scenario. In both scenarios, we assume that Turkish governments will continue to improve health care, nutrition, and potable water supplies. Under these circumstances, we expect infant mortality to drop roughly in half and life expectancy to rise to 69 years by the year 2000 (table 8). The small range between our high and low projections primarily reflects our belief that the scope for further reductions in fertility rates is, in general, small. 25X1 25X1

Table 7
Turkey: Assumed Fertility and Mortality Rates for Population Projections, 1980-2000

	1980	1990	2000
Projection assumptions			
Total fertility rate (*per woman*)			
High growth	4.4	3.4	2.8
Low growth	4.4	3.0	2.4
Life expectancy at birth (*years*)	59.8	64.9	69.0
Infant mortality (*per 1,000 live births*)	106.2	76.0	53.2
Derived measures			
Birthrate (*per 1,000*)			
High growth	32.9	27.5	23.0
Low growth	32.9	24.6	20.6
Death rate (*per 1,000*)			
High growth	10.6	7.8	6.6
Low growth	10.6	7.7	6.6
Natural increase (*percent*)			
High growth	2.2	2.0	1.6
Low growth	2.2	1.7	1.4

Table 8
Turkey:
Labor Force Participation Rates

Percent

Age Group	1960	1970	1980	Projected	
				1990	2000
15 and older	79.9	72.4	64.5	62.4	60.4
Men	93.7	90.4	84.2	80.4	79.8
Women	65.9	54.3	43.5	39.2	37.2
15 to 19	72.9	66.6	60.3	54.7	59.8
Men	78.6	74.0	69.3	64.0	60.0
Women	66.2	58.2	50.2	45.2	47.2
20 and older	81.1	74.5	65.5	61.5	59.8
Men	96.5	92.0	87.6	83.5	83.0
Women	65.8	54.0	42.1	38.0	35.5

25X1

Impact on the Labor Force. We expect the working-age population to expand by only 2.7 percent a year in the 1980s—down from 3 percent annually in the 1970s—because of past declines in fertility. A continuing deceleration in the 1990s is likely, with the working-age population expanding at an average 2.4 percent annually. Our estimates remain essentially the same under both our high and low projections for total population because those who will be entering the labor force over the next 15 years or so have already been born. Thus, the size and composition of the labor force in the years ahead will be determined largely by future trends in participation rates.

We expect rising demand for farm labor to slow the decline in female participation in the 1980s.[11] The decline probably will slow further in the 1990s as younger and better educated females become increasingly accepted into nonagricultural sectors of the economy. We also expect the declines in male labor force participation of recent decades to slow by the number of men in the prime working ages. Nevertheless, overall participation by men still will probably drop 4 to 5 percentage points over the next two decades, and that by women 6 to 7 percentage points (table 9).

25X1

25X1

We expect some 4 million persons to be added to the labor force during 1981-90—an average annual increase of 2.0 percent, compared with 1.9 percent annually in the 1970s.[12] For the full 20-year period, the labor force should increase by 9.3-9.4 million persons. Our projected totals for the labor force for the year 2000, thus, are 27.4-27.5 million.

25X1

We expect Turkey to continue making good progress in increasing the educational level of the labor force.

25X1

[11] Rising demand for farm labor would contrast with the normal pattern of development in industrializing countries, where demand for farm labor usually drops steadily. The author's more optimistic forecasts are based on the conclusions of a World Bank study, which projected that demand for farm labor would rise if Turkish success in increasing agricultural exports (particularly to the Middle East) continues, and if Turkish governments continue to support free trade policies and deregulate internal markets.

25X1

[12] The share of labor force members in the 15-to-24 age group should slip from 34 percent in 1980 to 32 percent in 1985 and to 27 percent in the year 2000.

25X1

Table 9
Turkey: Output, Employment, and Productivity Growth Rates for 1961-80, and Projections Through 2000

Average annual percent change

	Output	Employment	Productivity
1961-80	**5.5**	**1.3**	**4.2**
Agriculture	2.8	−0.1	4.9
Industry	7.5	3.4	4.0
Other sectors	6.4	4.3	2.0
1981-85	**4.4**	**1.8**	**2.6**
Agriculture	2.7	0.5	2.2
Industry	5.3	3.4	1.8
Other sectors	4.7	3.4	1.3
1986-2000			
High growth	**6.2**	**2.7**	**3.4**
Agriculture	2.8	1.0	1.8
Industry	8.2	4.6	3.4
Other sectors	6.1	4.1	1.9
Intermediate growth	**5.7**	**2.3**	**3.3**
Agriculture	2.2	0.8	1.4
Industry	6.8	4.1	2.6
Other sectors	5.4	3.7	1.6
Low growth	**4.3**	**1.8**	**2.5**
Agriculture	1.5	0.5	1.0
Industry	3.7	1.8	1.9
Other sectors	5.6	3.8	1.7

Because we expect the school-age population to grow only 1 percent annually from 1981 to 2000—only about one-third the rate of 1961-80—Ankara should be able to expand enrollment rates substantially without significantly increasing education's share of the central government budget. Aided by the large recent expansion of college facilities, the share of college graduates in the labor force should more than double—reaching, however, only 6 to 7 percent. At the same time, secondary school graduates—whom we define as skilled workers—should increase by nearly three-fifths, to some 11 percent of the work force. The overall literacy rate should rise to 82 percent for persons 15 and over (92 percent for males and 71 percent for females), compared with 68 percent in 1980. This will reduce the share of illiterates in the labor force to about 6 percent and their share in the total population (15 and over) to about 18 percent in 2000, compared with 30 percent in 1980. 25X1

Impact on Employment. The substantial growth of the working-age population in the coming two decades will test the ability of future Turkish governments to encourage the necessary job creation. The number of jobs created will depend not only on the overall rate of economic growth but also on the job-creating capacity of the economic sectors driving growth. 25X1

The Turkish economy is recovering from the 1979/80 recession, aided by a fundamental restructuring designed to make it more responsive to market forces and more oriented to export markets. Real GDP, which fell 2 percent in 1980, rose an average of 4 percent annually in 1981-83. We project average annual growth in 1984-85 at 5 percent, giving an average for the five-year period of 4.4 percent. This projection assumes that:

- Ankara will maintain the international competitiveness of the lira achieved by the large devaluation in January 1980 and continued exchange rate adjustments since.

- The government will stick to the main features of the 1980-83 financial stabilization program: restricting government spending, maintaining realistic interest rates, and curbing subsidies to State Economic Enterprises. The chances for this are enhanced by the fact that Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party won a parliamentary majority in the 6 November 1983 election, and Ozal is the principal architect of the current economic program. 25X1

- Turkish businessmen will retain their new outward orientation and exploit the new exchange rate policies to develop external markets. 25X1

We calculate that economic growth of 4.4 percent annually through 1985 will generate only about 300,000 new jobs a year compared with our projected

Alternative Growth Scenarios

To assess the job market through 1985, we have projected growth on the basis of consensus estimates by several authorities. To evaluate job market conditions in the 1986-2000 period, we have examined three alternative economic growth scenarios put forward by the World Bank: (1) high growth, which assumes that Turkey will continue to grow at rates only a little below its exceptionally strong performance during 1971-77; (2) intermediate growth, which corresponds to average performance during the 20-year period 1961-80; and (3) low growth, which constitutes an estimate of the downside risks that the Turkish economy is most likely to face in the years ahead:

- *The high-growth scenario, which specifies an industry-led, 6.2-percent economic growth rate during the period, assumes that the economic stabilization program will remain basically intact, that frequent exchange rate adjustments will keep the lira competitive, and that businessmen will retain their new external orientation. In these circumstances, Turkey could expect to enjoy a favorable current account balance while maintaining a high level of government and private investment expenditures—largely domestically financed. In view of the economy's demonstrated dynamism, such a regimen could produce an even higher growth rate.*

- *Our intermediate scenario is also industry led. It projects 5.7-percent GDP growth annually and differs from the high-growth scenario only in that it assumes that domestic political exigencies, or external shocks, will induce occasional departures from high-growth policies—as has been the case three times in the past 30 years.*

- *Our low-growth scenario is services led. It projects 4.3-percent economic growth and assumes that a combination of domestic political difficulties and external shocks will consistently prevent Turkish governments from maintaining the competitiveness of the lira and domestic financial stability. We believe these to be the most likely downside risks to which the economy might be subjected in the years ahead.* [redacted] 25X1

The scenarios contain two fundamental job-creation assumptions which were also incorporated into our 1984-85 projections. First, we assume that maintaining competitive lira exchange rates—as incorporated in our high- and intermediate-growth scenarios—will raise the cost of capital goods and induce industry to use more labor-intensive production methods than in the recent past. Specifically, we assume that the job-creation ratio for industry will reach a level similar to that of other countries in comparable economic situations and rise by 1 percentage point over the rate attained during 1961-80. Second, we assume higher future costs for farm equipment and labor. Our specific estimates for expansion of farm output and employment for 1986-2000 are based on those of a World Bank study mission to Turkey in May-June 1982 covering the period through 1990. [redacted] 25X1

labor force growth of 390,000 persons annually. A little more than one-half of the gain in jobs will, we believe, come from services and related sectors, while industrial expansion probably will absorb another 30 percent. Agriculture can be expected to absorb the remainder. The job shortfall will push up the unemployment rate to about 12 percent by 1985.[13] [redacted] 25X1

Looking ahead, we believe that a growth rate of about 5.7 percent annually—our intermediate projection—is the highest that Turkey is likely to be able to sustain for the last 15 years of the century. We therefore think it likely that future governments will face domestic and external pressures comparable to those of the past and probably will respond to them in familiar ways. The temptation to respond to unemployment with expensive job creation programs and to foreign competition with trade barriers will be high. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1

[13] In fact, because of the slower growth of job creation in the first half of the period, the unemployment rate probably will substantially exceed 12 percent by the end of 1984. [redacted] 25X1

Figure 2
Turkey: Growth of Total Population, Working Age Population, Labor Force, and Total Employment, 1961-2000

Average annual percent change



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Table 10 *1,000 persons*
Turkey: Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment Projections to 2000

A. 1981-85	1980	1985	
Agriculture	9,369	9,596	
Industry	2,384	2,818	
Other sectors	4,433	5,240	
Total employed	16,186	17,654	
Unemployed	1,936	2,420	
Labor force	18,122	20,074	
Unemployment rate (*percent*)	10.7	12.1	
B. 1986-2000 (on a 1985 base) [a]	1985	1990	2000
High growth			
Agriculture	9,596	10,085	11,141
Industry	2,818	3,529	5,532
Other sectors	5,240	6,406	9,574
Total employed	17,654	20,020	26,247
Unemployed	2,420	2,120	1,199
Labor force	20,074	22,140	27,446
Unemployment rate (*percent*)	12.1	9.6	4.4
Intermediate growth			
Agriculture	9,596	9,986	10,814
Industry	2,818	3,445	5,149
Other sectors	5,240	6,284	9,037
Total employed	17,654	19,715	25,000
Unemployed	2,420	2,425	2,446
Labor force	20,074	22,140	27,446
Unemployment rate (*percent*)	12.1	11.0	8.9
Low growth			
Agriculture	9,596	9,838	10,341
Industry	2,818	3,081	3,683
Other sectors	5,240	6,314	9,168
Total employed	20,074	19,233	23,192
Unemployed	2,420	2,907	4,254
Labor force	20,074	22,140	27,446
Unemployment rate (*percent*)	12.1	13.1	15.5

[a] Labor force, and thus unemployment, projections are based on the medium projection for the total population, excluding external migration. Because of the very slight differences among the high, low, and medium labor force projections, we have not shown separate unemployment projections for the high and low labor force projections.

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If Turkey can maintain this growth rate, however, the economy will do a far better job of meeting employment needs than it did during 1961-80 (figure 2). Economic growth at these levels would generate some 490,000 jobs annually during 1986 to 2000, virtually equal to projected labor force growth (table 10) even if not cutting into the numbers of unemployed. Slightly more than one-half of the new jobs would come from services and other sectors, 15 to 20 percent from agriculture, and the remainder from industry. With industrial growth averaging 6.8 percent annually, industrial jobs would employ more than 5 million persons by 2000; nonagricultural employment would

show a 4-percent annual gain and would account for 57 percent of total jobs, up from 42 percent in 1980. Under these positive conditions and in the absence of external migration, the unemployment rate would decline by about one-fourth to around 9 percent at the end of the century (although the total number of unemployed would remain approximately constant). [redacted]

Economic growth at the high-growth, 6.2-percent level—which we judge unlikely—would largely eliminate unemployment by the late 1990s; the unemployment rate might dip to as low as 4 percent. Economic growth at the low, 4.3-percent level, on the other hand, would seriously intensify unemployment, with the rate for the active labor force climbing to 15 to 16 percent by the year 2000. [redacted]

Given the demographic realities, a relatively modest change in the economic growth rate thus could have major social and political implications for Turkey. [redacted]

Impact on Urbanization. We expect urban population growth to average 3.3 percent annually to the end of the century, with the number of urbanites approximately doubling to 40 million and accounting for about 60 percent of the population. With rising job opportunities in agriculture and slower total population growth, we expect rural-urban migration to be somewhat lower than during the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, more than one-third of urban growth will still be attributable to rural-urban migration. Rural population growth will slip to 0.3 percent annually, compared with 1.3 percent during the past 20-year period. [redacted]

Economic growth and urban expansion are likely to flourish in areas where natural resources are concentrated and where transportation, electric power, and communications networks already exist. We expect the four large metropolitan provinces—Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana—which together accounted for about 40 percent of new nonagricultural jobs and more than 45 percent of urban population growth during 1961-80—to absorb roughly similar shares in the years ahead. [redacted]

The absolute increase in population will almost certainly continue to be greatest in Istanbul Province, while the growth rate probably will continue to be most rapid in Ankara Province. Based on past and prospective trends, we expect the population of the Istanbul metropolitan area to climb to 6.4 million by 1990 and to perhaps 9 million by the year 2000. Most of the growth will take place in the contiguous suburbs, which grew 12 percent annually in the past two decades. By 1990, the population of Ankara should hit 2.8 million, followed by the Izmir metropolitan area with 1.7 million, and Adana with 0.8 million (table 11). [redacted]

In the nonmetropolitan provinces, urban growth will probably be the greatest in absolute terms in the Central Anatolia and Marmara Regions—which enjoyed the greatest absolute growth in both urban population and nonagricultural jobs during 1961-80—and the most rapid in percentage terms in the Mediterranean Region. Urban expansion in the Aegean, Black Sea, and West Anatolia Regions will continue to lag the rest of the country. [redacted]

Cities of 100,000 to 500,000 population as a group have been the most dynamic since 1960; they should continue to show the greatest percentage growth rates. The industrial city of Kirikkale in Ankara Province, Turkey's most rapidly growing large city, should top the 300,000 mark by 1990. Other dynamic cities with strong nonagricultural employment growth—Bursa and Izmit in the Marmara Region, Antalya and Mersin in the Mediterranean Region, Maras in Central Anatolia, Diyarbakir in East Anatolia, and Gaziantep in Southeast Anatolia—should all show population gains of 45 percent or more during the 10-year period. Much of this growth will come—as during 1961-80—from the migration of young people from smaller cities and rural areas of eastern and northern provinces. [redacted]

Prospects for External Migration. Prospects seem fairly good that foreign demand will support a net outflow of Turkish workers for the next two years or so at close to the 42,000-46,000 rate of 1962-80.

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Table 11
Turkey: Population Projections for Cities of 100,000 and Over

1,000 persons

City	1960	1980	1990 Projected
Marmara Region			
Balikesir	60	128	149
Bursa	152	458	684
Istanbul metropolitan area	1,614	4,477	6,388
Contiguous suburbs	161	1,624	
Izmit (Kocaeli Province)	72	195	283
Aegean Region			
Izmir metropolitan area	502	1,255	1,720
Contiguous suburbs	145	475	
West Anatolia Region			
Denizli	49	139	200
Eskisehir	152	318	411
Black Sea Region			
Adapazari (Sakarya Province)	78	135	163
Samsun	87	205	276
Trabzon	52	111	145
Zonguldak	53	112	145
Mediterranean Region			
Adana	230	590	816
Antalya	51	179	274
Iskenderun (Hatay Province)	61	129	166
Mersin (Icel Province)	67	222	334
Tarsus (Icel Province)	51	124	168
Central Anatolia Region			
Ankara	644	1,932	2,832
Kayseri	102	289	412
Kirikkale (Ankara Province)	42	183	307
Konya	119	338	482
Maras	54	184	279
Malatiya	83	184	241
Sivas	92	178	223
East Anatolia Region			
Diyarbakir	79	243	356
Elazig	59	147	200
Erzurum	89	195	254
Southeast Anatolia Region			
Gaziantep	123	385	567
Urfa	59	151	208

Beyond then, the odds are that Turkey can count on a net migration of only some 20,000 to 30,000 workers annually during the final 15 years or so of this century because of growing inhospitability to Turkish workers in Western Europe. However, the estimative range for the later years is great. 25X1

The success of Turkish construction firms in garnering contracts in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and other oil-rich Arab states brought new jobs in the Middle East for some 35,000 to 45,000 Turks annually during 1981-83. This flow should be sustained for a couple more years, even though construction programs have leveled off because of reduced oil revenues and the completion of the construction phases of development programs. At the same time, the number of Turkish workers in Western Europe—principally West Germany—apparently has been increasing by several thousand (net) annually despite negative public and official attitudes toward Turkish workers. This has been mainly the result of West German willingness to allow the children of Turkish workers to join their families in West Germany as they approach working ages. 25X1

West German policy may become more restrictive in the next several years, given current high levels of West German unemployment. The Kohl government probably would like those Turks in West Germany unwilling to become German citizens to leave, but differences within Kohl's coalition have prevented Bonn from implementing a program to reduce their numbers significantly.[14] In late 1983, for example, a bill to cut the age at which the children of Turkish workers living in Turkey could rejoin their families was shelved, and a bill offering financial incentives to unemployed Turkish workers to return home was made so restrictive that only a few thousand could qualify. 25X1

[14] The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP)—the junior partner in Chancellor Kohl's coalition—has strongly resisted restrictive measures against Turkish workers. The FDP traditionally has cultivated an image of tolerance, and any deviation from this posture in regard to Turkish workers could cause major disaffection within its ranks and threaten the stability of the coalition. 25X1

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Beyond the mid-1980s, the prospects for foreign demand for Turkish workers become increasingly conjectural. Even if Turkey were to become a full-fledged member of the European Community, it is unlikely that Turkish workers would be granted the full rights of free movement within the EC that apply to workers in present EC member countries—at least not for several years. Moreover, the course of world oil prices will become an increasingly important determinant of labor demand in the oil states. If oil revenues continue to decline, demand for Turkish workers will probably disappear.

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On the other hand, if oil prices stabilize, Arab efforts to continue diversifying the sources of expatriate workers probably could sustain a net demand for Turkish workers of some 10,000 to 20,000 per year more or less indefinitely. And if renewed shortages were to cause oil prices to soar in the years ahead, the extent of net migration of Turkish workers to the Middle East probably would be limited only by conditions on the supply side. Finally, when West Germany's native labor force begins to decline in the 1990s, it will again be forced to recruit foreign labor, perhaps finding room for another 10,000 to 20,000 Turkish workers annually during the decade.

Social and Political Implications

If our projections are accurate, future governments will continue to face major obstacles in meeting the needs of the Turkish people, even though long-term trends are improving. Total and urban population growth are both slowing, outflows of Turkish workers to foreign lands will continue, and the growth of the 15-to-24 age group is slowing as well.

However, the working-age population will continue to grow at rates substantially above that of the total population throughout the rest of this century. Labor force participation rates are unlikely to drop as sharply as they did during the 1960s, and labor force growth will probably be sustained in the years ahead at close to the pace of the 1970s, even if external migration continues. The unemployment rate is still rising and will remain close to present levels throughout the 1980s, even though we expect it to fall fairly sharply during the 1990s (figure 3). Meanwhile, although the *rate* of urban expansion is slowing, the absolute increase in the number of urbanites will be larger than ever before.

Figure 3
Turkey: Unemployment Rates Based on Projected Foreign Demand for Turkish Workers, 1960-2000



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Unemployment. There is very little the government can do in the years ahead to bring down unemployment at a rate faster than we have projected. Administrative efforts to force employers to use more labor-intensive production methods or to take on unneeded workers could endanger financial stability and lead to even more serious problems. Similarly, a forced expansion of secondary school and college training facilities or of military conscription could quickly bring down unemployment in the 15-to-24 age group, but such steps would be only temporary palliatives.

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We believe the most that Turkish governments can do to cope with unemployment is to ensure that the policy requirements for achieving economic growth at the 5.7-percent level or better are maintained. As noted above, a satisfactory rate of job creation will require that the lira be competitive to keep the cost of

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imported equipment high and induce more labor-intensive production methods. If this requirement is not fully met, the job-creation capacity of industry could slip back to 1961-80 levels. This would reduce our midrange employment projection for 2000 by 700,000 jobs and raise our projected unemployment rate to 8.9 percent. A competitive lira, and the accompanying outward orientation of Turkish construction firms, probably is also indispensable for sustaining the flow of Turkish workers to the Middle East.

Urbanization. In our judgment, it is unlikely that Turkish governments will attempt to slow the growth of the major urban conglomerations by directing nonagricultural investment to smaller cities or to less urbanized regions. This would run counter to their need to ensure that the job-creating potential of new investment is fully exploited. They are likely to rely heavily on market forces to determine the geographic distribution of new nonagricultural investment. Most future nonfarm investment probably will continue to be distributed regionally very much as in the recent past. Any government probably will ensure for political reasons that the far eastern provinces continue to receive a significant share of new investment, but governments are likely to rely more on the growing mobility of Turkish workers to take them where the new jobs are.

Despite the increasing absolute size of Turkey's urban concentrations, the initial shock of urbanization is already past; future governments should be able to maintain and possibly even improve the provision of basic health and educational services to urbanites. Housing will be another matter, as the share of urbanites living in shantytowns unquestionably will rise substantially. Ankara has made significant efforts to improve the livability of the *gecekondus* by providing electric power, potable water, sewer connections, and other services. These programs almost certainly will continue, and even modest progress could pay considerable dividends in terms of limiting unrest and boosting support for the government.

Potential for Unrest and Violence

The economic and demographic developments we project will make Turkey a very different place to live by the year 2000:

- About 14 million people—a bit more than one-half of a labor force of 27 million—will have nonagricultural jobs; most of the growth in nonagricultural employment will take place in the 16 provinces that had the greatest growth in both employment and total population in the 1960s and 1970s. 25X1

- Approximately 40 million Turks—60 percent of the total—will live in cities; again, much of this growth will be concentrated in Turkey's 16 most dynamic provinces.

- Slightly more than 80 percent of the population in the 15-and-over age group will be literate.

- Ethnic Kurds will number some 6.6 million, about 10 percent of the population; we expect an increasing share to join the westward and southwestward flow of job-seeking young migrants.

- Unemployment will remain high—only slightly down from 2.2 million in 1985 and 2.1 million in 1990; more than 60 percent of the unemployed will be in the 15-to-24 age group, and the great majority 25X1 will most likely continue to be secondary school graduates. 25X1

These developments are likely, we believe, to erode traditional conservative political forces in Turkey. Rising urbanization will reduce the share of the population directly subject to traditional rural client-patron relationships and over time lessen the influence of traditional rural conservatism. In the case of the Kurds, the domination of the *agas*—tribal leaders and large landowners—is likely to begin to slip. Higher literacy rates also will tend to make the average Turk better informed of conditions inside and outside Turkey and more demanding of government. Expansion of the nonagricultural labor force will undoubtedly 25X1

Political and Religious Unrest and Violence

The high correlation in recent years between rising unemployment among the 15-to-24 age group in Turkey and increased antisocial activity provides circumstantial evidence that the two phenomena are closely related. This age group has created problems in many societies, although it is usually more prone to common criminality than organized political crime. The lack of opportunity to fulfill their career aspirations has borne heavily on young men with secondary school educations. Unemployment rates for this group were extremely high and the path to university training was blocked for most by the woeful lack of college facilities. Thus, it seems likely that a substantial share of the "political"—and, perhaps to a lesser extent, religious—unrest and violence of recent years is traceable to the large increase in the number of frustrated young men with too much time on their hands.

The experience of most other countries has, nevertheless, demonstrated that high unemployment rates are not in themselves sufficient to explain unrest and violence. This also appears to be confirmed by the Turkish experience. To examine this connection, we compared unemployment rates for 15-to-24 year-old males and for male secondary school graduates in the violence-prone provinces with those for provinces in which little or no violence has been reported. For example, we compared Istanbul and Adana, where extensive "political" violence occurred, with the control provinces of Bursa and Kocaeli, where little or none was reported. In the case of Kurdish separatist agitation, we have compared seven provinces having the most reported Kurdish disturbances with four other provinces reporting Kurdish majorities or near-majorities in the 1965 census.

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Our results (table 12) clearly demonstrate that factors other than high unemployment were involved in producing unrest and violence. Although unemployment rates in the violence-prone provinces generally averaged a little higher than those in the control provinces, there are a number of exceptions. In any case, the differences appear too small to be significant. We believe our results may partly reflect migration of young men from relatively peaceful provinces to provinces where organized terrorist gangs were already in existence. In sum, we believe unrest and violence can only be understood in the light of the full range of social and economic pressures to which Turkey has been subject.

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produce a large rise in labor union membership, commensurately increasing the influence of organized labor. The growing number of persons with secondary school diplomas and college degrees will place new and greater demands on government for jobs commensurate with their skills and expectations.

A brief review of the driving impulses of the violence of the 1960s and 1970s suggests that these developments carry high risks of social and political instability. The violence of the period can be broken down into three component categories:

- *Political* unrest and violence, which involved rival terrorist groups with radical political and social goals. These groups were divided along leftist (mostly Marxist, including the Kurdish separatist agitators) and rightist lines. These groups warred mainly on each other, but also mounted attacks against public officials and other prominent persons, as well as the general public. In our view, they presented the major threat to Turkish stability and did the most to provoke subsequent military intervention.

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- *Religious* unrest and violence, which arose from conflicts between the majority Sunnis and Alevi Muslims. The Alevis, who are estimated to number about 12 million, or one-fourth of the total population, belong to a branch of Shiism and have different religious beliefs and practices from the Sunnis. They have been identified in the public mind as leftists. Unrest and violence involving them usually took the form of mob action by Sunnis, who tended to blame the Alevis indiscriminately for atrocities allegedly committed by leftist terrorists.

Table 12
Turkey: Unemployment Rates for Males Over 15, 15 to 24, and Secondary School Graduates, 1980 [a]

Percent

	Over 15	15 to 24	Secondary School Graduates
Metropolitan provinces			
Violence prone			
Istanbul	16.0	20.7	18.3
Adana	14.1	18.3	20.6
Control			
Bursa	12.1	15.7	19.2
Kocaeli	14.4	21.8	14.0
All other violence-prone provinces (14) [b]	**12.9**	**19.3**	**23.9**
All other control provinces (16) [b]	**10.6**	**16.4**	**23.2**
Of which:			
Alevi Provinces: [c]			
Violence prone (3)	14.1	22.2	24.8
Control (1)	8.5	11.9	19.3
Kurdish Provinces: [d]			
Violence prone (7)	12.8	19.2	25.6
Control (4)	11.4	19.2	29.0

[a] Includes only the 34 provinces for which detailed 1980 data are available; these provinces are listed in table A-3.
[b] Data for these provinces have been adjusted to exclude the armed forces since their presence exerts a dampening influence on unemployment rates.
[c] The four Alevi Provinces are: (violence-prone) Elazig, Erzincan, Malatya, and (control) Yozgat.
[d] The 11 Kurdish Provinces are (violence-prone) Adiyaman, Agri, Bingol, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa, and (control) Bitlis, Hakkiri, Mus, and Van.

- Labor unrest and massive strikes, which took place in support of demands that went beyond customary bread-and-butter issues. Labor acted to enforce its views on issues to embrace wider issues such as labor participation in management and the repeal of legislation unfavorable to organized labor. Relatively little violence actually took place, although the threat was clear in the public mind.

The unrest and violence were overwhelmingly urban phenomena. Young men 15 to 24 were responsible for more than 80 percent of the "political" violence. As a group, political terrorists were far better educated than the general Turkish populace but predominantly of lower-middle-class or lower-class origin.[15] Men from the 15-to-24 age group also played important roles in religious and labor unrest and violence, but age, education, and class origin were not distinguishing features of the latter two forms of unrest. Apart from the Kurds, Turkey's several ethnic minority groups [16] did not play significant roles in the unrest and violence. Even in the case of the Kurds, there is no evidence that the young, mostly Marxist activists ever received significant support from the general Kurdish population. 25X1

"Political" and labor unrest and violence were concentrated in the four large metropolitan provinces of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Diyarbakir and several other eastern provinces were the main centers of Kurdish separatist agitation. Religious unrest and violence were largely confined to several eastern provinces containing large concentrations of Alevis.[17] 25X1

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[16] These groups are (roughly in order of numerical importance as reported in the 1965 census): Arabs, concentrated in Hatay, Mardin, Urfa, and Siirt Provinces; Zazas, concentrated in Diyarbakir, Bingol, Elazig, and Urfa Provinces; Circassians, concentrated in Kayseri Province; Greeks and Armenians, concentrated in Istanbul; and Georgians and Laz, concentrated in Artvin, Rize, Sakarya, and Ordu Provinces. 25X1 25X1

[17] Largely because of the apparent reluctance of the Turkish press to accurately identify instances of sectarian violence, we are not certain as to how much of the unrest and violence in the Alevi Provinces was religious and how much would be more accurately termed "political." 25X1

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Outlook: Can the System Cope?

Turkey is at a turning point. The military took power in 1980 because previous democratic governments were unable to control the mounting violence which was a product of social and economic change. It has returned power to a democratic, civilian government, but progress toward a strengthening of democratic institutions and procedures will be slow. A multiparty system is struggling to emerge, the Grand National Assembly has regained its legislative function, and civilian courts have assumed some of their former judicial authority. Nevertheless, the executive function is still shared between a president who represents military interests and a civilian prime minister.

The need to reform and rebuild the Turkish economy in the face of major demographic change makes the democratic experiment even more fragile. The Ozal government is trying to restructure the economy along free market lines, a revolutionary and controversial experiment that has begun to move Turkey away from its traditional adherence to the statist philosophy of Kemal Ataturk. The goals are to encourage economic growth, provide more jobs, and make Turkey more self-reliant and competitive. A beginning has been made on eliminating some of the bureaucratic and administrative constraints on the private sector of the economy and on shifting investment resources from the state sector to the private sector. Private enterprises have responded with an impressive show of dynamism—exports are on the rise, industrial production is growing, and inflation has begun to moderate. Success, however, is far from complete—unemployment, in particular, continues to be discouragingly high.

Any fundamental resolution of Turkey's problems will require considerable time and a sustained commitment on the part of this and future governments. Such a commitment will be extremely difficult to maintain—perhaps impossible, over the time frame of this paper. The free market reforms the present government is promoting strike at the interests of a substantial share of the political and bureaucratic elites—indeed, there has already been considerable grumbling among them. Below the level of the elites, there are bound to be some painful dislocations as what has been a sheltered economy is exposed to the forces of the free market. In addition, to a considerable degree the health of the Turkish economy is linked to that of the world economy and thus is beyond the control of Turkish policymakers. Finally, whatever degree of success Turkish governments may have in expanding economic opportunity and essential services to meet growing needs, the expectations of an increasingly literate and urbanized population may be rising faster than the system's ability to meet them. 25X1

The ability of Turkish governments to meet the multiple challenges with which economic development and demographic change will confront them are vital to the future of democracy in Turkey. Looking ahead to the end of the century, we find it difficult to be very confident. The patterns and habits of authoritarian rule have deep roots, which go back to the long centuries of Ottoman rule and which remain, despite the counteracting development of democratic institutions and traditions in this century. 25X1

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The founder of the Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk, established the pattern of modern Turkish politics, in which periods of democratic government have alternated with interludes of authoritarian or military rule. Ataturk himself, although a convinced advocate of democratic and "Western" institutions, intervened forcefully whenever he thought it necessary to correct the "excesses" or "errors" of parliamentary governments. More recently, Turkish military leaders intervened in 1960, 1971, and 1980 to overturn or restrict parliamentary governments which they believed were incapable of dealing with political factionalism, economic problems, or terrorism. 25X1

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In the meantime, the pressures likely to be created in the years ahead by the demographic changes sketched in this paper will be at least as severe as those that have led to the collapse of previous democratic governments. Indeed, if democratic government cannot cope with the changes, terrorism is almost certain to resurface as a significant problem, and increasingly serious urban disturbances could occur. Although urban unrest on a massive scale has not yet made its appearance on the modern Turkish scene, the growth

of urbanization makes it a more likely prospect for the future. We believe that four alternatives are possible if democratic government collapses in the face of rapid social and economic change. [redacted]

Military Intervention. In our view, another military intervention is the most likely outcome of a failure of democratic government. Military intervention is a time-honored tradition in periods of crisis, and the military is the most powerful and respected force in the country. The bulk of the population, as well as the military itself, would expect the armed forces to come to the country's aid if democracy were to "fail." The military, moreover, is obedient and relatively free of extremists. During a crisis it would act to preempt the extremist groups by seizing power itself and restoring order as quickly as possible. It probably would attempt initially to prop up existing democratic institutions until a new government could be appointed or elected. If this did not work, however, the military almost certainly would assume power directly, instituting martial law and dissolving the National Assembly, political parties, and the cabinet. The intent, as in the past, probably would be a short period of direct rule and a gradual restoration of democracy. If the military takes power again, however, it could be years before democratic government returns. [redacted]

The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. We believe that other alternatives to democracy are much less likely than military intervention. A takeover by Islamic fundamentalists is perhaps the most conceivable of these relatively unlikely contingencies. Even though Turkey has been a secular state in both fact and theory since the founding of the republic in 1924, Islam has always retained a strong foothold. During the last few years there have been some signs of a rejuvenation of religious influence on Turkey's official life. Prime Minister Ozal is himself a devout Muslim, and an influential faction in his Motherland Party has its origins in the now-banned National Salvation Party, which had represented the interests of Islamic conservatism before 1980. [redacted]

There are, however, formidable obstacles to any expansion of Islamic influence beyond its present modest proportions. Unlike Iran, Turkey has no established hierarchy of religious leaders with the strength and inclination to vie for power. Indeed, the political influence of Islam in Turkey has declined steadily since the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. In addition, a commitment to secularism is deeply engrained in the political and military elites and in large segments of the population. Most important, military commanders repeatedly have shown themselves to be strongly opposed to any alteration of the secular orientation of the Turkish state. There is little reason to doubt that they would react forcefully to any upsurge in Islamic radicalism, particularly if sponsored from abroad. Even without the opposition of the military, there would appear to be little future for Khomeinism in Turkey—with its Shiite origins it is suspect in the eyes of the Sunnis, who comprise the vast bulk of Turkish Muslims. [redacted]

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Dictatorship of the Left. Leftwing terrorism, supported by a plethora of various Marxist parties, has been a common feature of the Turkish political scene for many years. Although currently under control, leftist terrorism has not been eliminated. We expect it to become more prevalent during the next couple of years under any circumstances, but an inability of democratic government to cope with demographic change clearly would provide the violent left with both the justification and opportunity to increase terrorist activities. If the state appeared to be weakening, the many different and antagonistic groups of the left might be induced to cooperate—at least temporarily—in a bid to seize power. These groups almost certainly could count on some Soviet and East European help, although precedent suggests it would be covert and of relatively modest dimensions. Even with outside help, however, it is unlikely that the radical left would be able to take power. Despite their propaganda and effectiveness as terrorists, the radical left has a very narrow base of support in Turkey. Marxism's link with the hereditary Russian foe limits its appeal, and Marxism in any variant violates the principles and traditional values of Islam that remain so important in Turkey. Most importantly, the military would crush, in bloody fashion if necessary, any attempt by the left to seize power. [redacted]

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Dictatorship of the Right. Rightwing terrorism has been almost as prevalent as leftwing terrorism over the past decade, but has been directed even more against the left than against governing institutions. If leftwing terrorism begins to grow again, rightwing radicals almost certainly will respond, attempting not only to retaliate against the left, but also trying to build support among military officers, Islamic fundamentalists, and rightwing political parties. Any attempt by the radical right to seize power, however, would face almost as many obstacles as would an attempt from the left. In addition to military opposition, rightwing terrorists have no significant outside source of support, and their degree of internal support, although potentially greater than that of the extreme left, does not appear to be enough to pull off a successful coup. 25X1

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Appendix

Turkish Statistics

Table A-1
North and East Mediterranean Region:
Comparative Labor Force Statistics [a]

	Total Population *(million)*	Total Labor Force *(million)*	Agriculture *(percent)*		Labor Force Participation *(percent)*			Annual Average Change in Participation Rates 1961-80 *(percent)*	
			All Workers	Women	Total	Men	Women	Men	Woman
West European states									
France	54.6	23.0	8	NA	55	69	42	−0.55	0.85
Greece	9.9	3.3	33	44	48	68	28	−1.37	−1.70
Italy	56.3	22.8	13	14	50	70	32	−0.64	1.34
Portugal	10.0	4.4	24	53	61	79	47	NA	NA
Spain	38.2	13.0	25[c]	13[c]	48	70	27	NA	NA
East European states									
Albania	2.8	0.6	NA	NA	71	84	57	−1.08	−1.44
Bulgaria	8.9	4.4	24	26	69	79	58	0.41	NEGL
Yugoslavia	22.8	9.2	45[c]	53[c]	56	74	39	−0.80	−0.52
Arab states									
Iraq	14.5	3.1	NA	NA	45	86	4	−0.66	NEGL
Jordan	3.4	0.8	10	NA	44	81	5	0.77	1.37
Syria	9.7	2.2	32	58	45	76	13	−0.38	−3.00
Other Muslim states									
Iran	42.5	12.0	37	41	49	83	13	−0.86	NEGL
Turkey	49.2	18.1	58	82	64	84	44	−0.53	−2.05

[a] Population data are for 1983; remaining data range from 1975 to 1981 unless otherwise indicated.
[b] Ages 15 and over.
[c] Data are for 1970-71.

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Table A-2
North and East Mediterranean Region: Comparative Socioeconomic and Demographic Statistics[a]

Country	Per Capita GNP (*US $*)	Urbanization (*percent*)	Literacy Rate (*percent*)	Life Expectancy (*years*)	Infant Mortality (*per 1,000*)	Death Rate (*per 1,000*)	Population Growth (*percent*)
West European states							
France	11,000	73	99	74	10	10	0.5
Greece	3,900	53	95	72	18	9	0.9
Italy	6,100	60	95	73	14	10	0.1
Portugal	2,400	26	70	69	26	10	0.4
Spain	5,000	66	97	73	10	8	0.6
East European states							
Albania	830	33	75	66	87	8	2.1
Bulgaria	3,800	63	95	70	20	11	0.3
Yugoslavia	3,300	35	85	68	33	9	0.8
Arab states							
Iraq	2,300	68	30	55	NA	13	3.3
Jordan	1,400	60	70	58	88	11	3.9
Syria	1,700	48	50	62	81	9	3.4
Other Muslim states							
Iran	1,600	49	50	57	112	12	3.1
Turkey	1,300	45	69	60	106	11	2.2

[a] Data range from 1979 to 1982.

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Table A-3
Turkey: Urbanization, Industrialization, and Socioeconomic Levels by Province, 1980

Percent

Province	Urban	Employment [a]		Literacy Rate [b]			Households With [c]	
		Nonfarm	Industry	Province	Urban	Rural	Electricity	Running Water
Highest level of industrialization								
Marmara (8)								
Bursa	57.5	50.7	22.8	71	80	70	76	42
Istanbul	92.6	94.3	43.1	84	85	80	90	82
Kocaeli	60.9	66.7	34.3	77	83	71	78	70
West Anatolia (8)								
Denizli	29.7	37.3	18.1	70	76	65	67	40
Eskisehir	57.3	50.2	20.8	81	83	74	72	48
Isparta*	34.2	53.3	23.8	69	80	65	77	53
Kutahya	30.1	30.5	16.1	67	79	59	50	34
Usak*	29.1	36.0	16.9	60	72	56	48	36
Black Sea (10)								
Rize*	19.1	41.7	18.8	61	73	58	71	52
Sakarya*	39.7	41.2	14.7	68	77	63	77	52
Zonguldak*	39.5	56.9	34.3	63	78	54	57	46
Mediterranean (4)								
Adana	58.3	41.3	18.0	69	74	61	68	61
Hatay	47.9	40.6	18.5	63	72	57	54	62
Central Anatolia (15)								
Ankara*	78.6	75.0	16.2	78	82	63	84	73
Kayseri*	51.5	49.8	16.6	66	72	60	65	45
Southeast Anatolia (5)								
Gaziantep	61.7	47.2	19.1	58	68	46	61	56
Intermediate industrialization								
Marmara (8)								
Balikesir*	34.8	32.2	7.9	69	83	65	58	42
Tekirdag*	42.3	41.6	9.0	73	77	71	61	44
Aegean (4)								
Aydin	32.5	33.7	14.0	70	79	66	66	55
Izmir*	71.8	57.8	13.6	67	81	71	79	74
Manisa*	41.1	30.6	11.1	64	71	59	64	49
Mugla*	13.9	30.4	8.2	69	79	67	38	31
West Anatolia (8)								
Afyon*	23.1	31.6	7.6	61	73	56	55	31
Bilecek	12.6	33.3	13.0	76	85	72	55	29
Burdur*	27.3	32.7	9.2	66	76	63	58	41
Black Sea (10)								
Bolu*	16.3	33.7	9.3	67	80	65	55	38
Giresun*	15.8	23.5	7.6	56	76	53	32	36
Samsun	33.4	26.8	10.7	62	75	55	46	45
Trabzon*	21.5	30.3	8.4	59	77	54	38	68

Table A-3
Turkey: Urbanization, Industrialization, and Socioeconomic Levels by Province, 1980 (continued)

Percent

Province	Urban	Employment [a]		Literacy Rate [b]			Households With [c]	
		Nonfarm	Industry	Province	Urban	Rural	Electricity	Running Water
Mediterranean (4)								
Antalya	33.6	29.2	10.5	71	82	65	43	40
Icel*	51.2	42.5	11.2	70	75	65	52	43
Central Anatolia (15)								
Kirsehir*	29.6	29.3	8.0	59	69	55	58	33
Konya*	41.7	33.0	9.8	67	67	67	57	40
Malatya	35.4	30.5	11.3	61	72	53	39	43
Nevsehir*	14.4	32.6	7.6	66	72	65	88	50
Sivas*	31.5	28.9	8.8	56	73	49	35	31
East Anatolia (13)								
Artvin	10.6	24.3	9.3	70	83	67	29	67
Diyarbakir	41.9	30.0	8.4	41	53	28	36	36
Elazig	32.8	34.9	13.7	58	70	48	52	38
Erzincan	25.5	34.5	9.7	68	79	61	39	34
Lowest level of industrialization								
Marmara (8)								
Canakkale*	22.1	31.0	6.5	70	81	67	42	28
Edirne*	35.8	39.3	5.1	72	77	69	58	39
Kirklareli*	23.4	41.1	6.4	75	81	73	53	41
Black Sea (10)								
Kastamonu*	12.1	21.9	4.7	53	72	50	27	31
Ordu*	17.8	22.3	6.8	50	70	46	23	27
Sinop*	11.6	21.3	3.7	54	81	52	21	28
Central Anatolia (15)								
Adiyaman	28.8	17.8	7.0	44	59	37	20	20
Amasya*	35.3	28.6	6.8	62	72	57	48	40
Cankiri	13.6	19.5	7.1	64	78	58	30	24
Corum	26.2	22.4	5.2	54	68	50	28	23
Maras*	36.6	29.7	6.6	52	64	46	31	30
Nigde	26.2	26.8	7.4	62	76	57	49	27
Tokat*	29.9	19.6	5.1	57	67	53	41	29
Yozgat	19.5	17.8	6.9	60	75	56	34	21

Table A-3 (continued)

Percent

Province	Urban	Employment [a]		Literacy Rate [b]			Households With [c]	
		Nonfarm	Industry	Province	Urban	Rural	Electricity	Running Water
East Anatolia (13)								
Agri	23.5	22.8	4.4	39	60	30	27	20
Bingol	12.3	16.0	4.9	44	62	39	23	23
Bitlis	34.0	20.7	5.7	38	56	28	28	24
Erzurum	33.7	27.9	7.4	57	71	48	38	26
Gumushane	13.1	18.3	7.0	62	80	59	18	23
Kars	19.3	21.0	4.1	57	73	51	26	19
Mus	18.3	16.5	4.6	42	61	35	19	13
Tunceli*	8.6	22.0	4.0	53	70	54	14	14
Van	28.2	23.3	5.4	37	56	26	24	20
Southeast Anatolia (5)								
Hakkari	20.8	18.3	5.0	32	54	22	14	14
Mardin	27.7	23.3	5.3	36	57	25	26	22
Siirt	36.0	24.1	6.9	36	55	25	33	31
Urfa	48.4	30.7	6.9	38	50	27	36	40

[a] Figures for provinces marked with an asterisk are estimated from 1975 data.
[b] Age 9 and over. Figures for provinces marked with an asterisk are for 1975.
[c] All data on electricity and running water are for 1975.

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Table A-4
Turkey: Provinces With the Poorest Employment Records, 1961-80

Average annual percent change

Province [b]	Total	Employment [a]					Total Population	1980 Unemployment Rate [a]
		Farm	Nonfarm	Industry	Labor Force			
Turkey	1.2	−0.1	4.0	3.4	1.8		2.6	10.7
Marmara (7)	0.9	−0.5	3.8	3.5	1.5		2.0	11.5
Canakkale*	−0.4	−1.0	1.2	0	0.2		0.9	12.0
Aegean (3)	1.1	0.4	2.9	1.4	1.6		2.0	10.9
West Anatolia (8)	0.4	−0.7	3.1	2.3	1.0		1.7	10.2
Afyon*	0	−1.1	4.6	2.7	0.7		1.5	12.4
Bilecik	−0.6	−1.9	4.2	4.1	−0.2		0.2	8.0
Isparta*	−0.1	−1.7	2.6	1.9	1.0		2.0	16.4
Usak*	−0.1	−1.2	3.2	2.0	0.7		1.6	13.6
Black Sea (10)	0.2	−0.9	4.1	2.7	0.9		1.9	11.8
Giresun*	−0.4	−1.2	3.8	2.5	0.5		1.3	17.5
Kastamonu*	−1.0	−1.8	3.3	0	−0.2		0.4	15.8
Rize*	−0.9	−2.6	3.3	2.5	0		2.0	16.5
Sinop*	−1.0	−1.8	4.2	0	−0.2		0.7	13.6
Trabzon*	0	−1.0	4.0	1.1	0.6		1.8	11.3
Mediterranean (3)	2.1	1.0	4.8	4.7	2.6		3.4	10.0
Central Anatolia (14)	0.4	−0.5	4.0	2.3	1.0		2.0	12.0
Cankiri	−0.5	−1.0	3.1	5.0	−0.2		0.5	5.8
Corum*	−0.3	−1.0	4.1	0.5	0.6		1.4	15.3
Kirsehir*	−0.2	−1.2	4.0	2.0	0.5		1.8	12.8
Sivas*	−1.2	−2.2	2.7	1.9	−0.4		0.8	15.3
Yozgat	−0.1	−0.5	4.8	6.5	0.4		1.3	6.0
East Anatolia (13)	0.9	0.3	3.5	3.6	1.3		2.3	7.7
Erzincan	−0.2	−1.3	3.1	3.1	0.2		0.9	6.6
Gumushane	0	−0.6	4.3	3.5	0.2		0.8	5.7
Tunceli*	−1.3	−2.0	2.3	0	0.4		0.8	16.4
Southeast Anatolia (5)	1.2	0.3	3.0	3.3	1.6		3.0	7.9

[a] Figures for provinces marked with an asterisk are estimated from 1975. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the unemployment rate to small changes in labor force and employment data, the 1980 unemployment rates for these provinces are subject to substantial margins of error.
[b] Regional averages in this table exclude the four large metropolitan provinces—Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana.

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Table A-5
Turkey: Provinces With the Highest Employment Growth, 1961-80

Average annual percent change

Province [a]	Employment [a]					Total Population	1980 Unemployment Rate [a]
	Total	Farm	Nonfarm	Industry	Labor Force		
Turkey (67 provinces)	1.2	−0.1	4.0	3.4	1.8	2.6	10.7
Marmara (8)	2.0	−0.5	4.0	4.8	5.8	3.4	12.2
Bursa	1.9	−0.1	5.2	4.8	2.3	2.7	8.8
Istanbul	3.7	−0.7	4.1	5.4	4.0	5.0	13.2
Kocaeli	1.5	−1.6	4.5	6.3	2.1	3.8	11.2
Aegean (4)	1.9	0.9	3.6	1.3	2.4	2.6	10.4
Aydin	1.1	0.4	2.8	2.0	1.5	1.9	7.5
Izmir*	3.0	1.9	4.1	1.2	3.4	3.3	9.9
Manisa*	1.1	0.4	3.0	1.3	1.8	2.0	12.3
West Anatolia (8)	0.4	−0.7	3.1	2.3	1.0	1.7	10.2
Denizli	1.0	0.2	2.5	1.9	1.3	2.0	7.1
Black Sea (10)	0.2	−0.9	4.1	2.7	0.9	1.9	11.8
Samsun	1.5	0.8	4.3	3.6	1.8	2.4	6.2
Ordu*	0.6		6.7	4.8	1.4	2.3	14.3
Zonguldak*	0.5		3.7	2.8	1.0	2.8	10.3
Mediterranean (4)	2.3	1.3	4.7	4.9	2.8	3.5	10.3
Adana	2.7	1.7	4.4	5.2	3.2	3.6	11.1
Antalya	2.4	1.5	5.9	4.8	2.8	3.2	7.4
Hatay	2.1	1.1	3.9	6.8	2.6	3.6	9.6
Icel*	1.8	0.3	5.2	2.4	2.5	3.4	13.1
Central Anatolia (15)	0.9	−0.6	4.5	2.8	1.4	2.5	11.3
Ankara*	2.9	−0.8	5.1	3.8	3.1	4.1	9.3
Kayseri*	0.6		3.9	1.2	1.0	2.6	9.3
Konya*	0.8	−0.3	4.1	2.4	1.6	2.5	14.1
Malatya	1.2	0.4	3.6	3.1	1.6	2.4	8.6
Maras*	1.6	0.4	6.6	2.6	2.3	3.4	13.3
Nigde	1.3	0.5	4.1	4.0	1.6	2.5	6.9
East Anatolia (13)	0.9	0.3	3.5	3.6	1.3	2.3	7.7
Agri	1.7	1.2	3.7	3.5	2.1	2.9	6.8
Diyarbakir	1.4	0.8	3.5	4.1	2.0	3.6	10.9
Van	2.9	2.4	5.8	5.6	3.3	4.3	6.7
Southeast Anatolia (5)	1.2	0.3	4.0	3.3	1.6	3.0	7.9
Gaziantep	1.6	0.1	4.0	4.1	2.0	3.3	8.6
Siirt	1.8	1.2	4.0	3.5	2.2	3.5	8.2

[a] Figures for provinces marked with an asterisk are estimated from 1975. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the unemployment rate to small changes in labor force and employment data, the 1980 unemployment rates for these provinces are subject to substantial margins of error.

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Figure 4
Impact of Population Growth in Turkey



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